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Positionality, Tension and Instability in the UN Security Council
Abstract
This paper* examines the ability of the UN Security Council to adapt to shifts in 
the relative power of UN members. It analyses the German and Japanese 
campaigns for permanent membership of the Security Council and the response 
that they have elicited from the current permanent members. It outlines the main 
areas of disagreement that exist in the current debate on Security Council reform 
and appraises the UN organisation’s attempts to resolve them. It concludes that 
the UN Security Council is an unstable institution of international governance 
both because it is exceedingly difficult for rising states to gain permanent 
membership and because it is impossible to demote current permanent members.



























































































Patrick A. Me Carthy
“[ilf... the Security Council emerges as defender or apologist 
for the status-quo, it will become the agent of the disorder it 
strives to avoid.”1
1 P. J. Fromuth, "The Making of a Security Community; The United Nations After the Cold 




























































































Positionality, Tension and Instability in the UN Security Council
1. Introduction2
UN member states are currently engaged in a debate on Security Council reform 
that, in contrast to a similar debate in the first half of the 1960s, goes far beyond 
the question of simply increasing the Council’s non-permanent membership. At 
stake in the current debate is the question of permanent membership and whether, 
and to whom, it should be extended. Although the debate is far from over, an 
examination of how the UN organisation deals with contemporary calls for 
fundamental reform of the Security Council serves to answer an important 
question: How well does the Security Council adapt to shifts in the relative power 
of UN members? In other words, how stable an institution of international 
governance is the Security Council?
The concept of stability used in this analysis may be distinguished from the 
conventional usage of the concept in the analysis of international relations. 
Stability is understood not as the preservation of the status-quo despite the 
occurrence of underlying change, but as the incremental and peaceful adaptation 
to such change. In this sense, the definition of stability used in this analysis is 
akin to Gilpin’s concept of homeostatic equilibrium,3 i.e., the incremental 
adjustment of the international system to small changes in the distribution of 
power among states. It may also be differentiated from this concept, however, 
insofar as it is based on the following specific assumptions about state behaviour.
The first assumption concerns states’ reactions to the relative growth of 
their own power. When a state perceives that its power is growing faster than 
other states in the international system, it will attempt to increase the influence it 
exerts on the governance of the system. In other words, it will attempt to improve 
upon its position in what I will call the international hierarchy of influence or, as 
Gilpin prefers to call it, the international hierarchy of prestige.4 This type of 
behaviour will be referred to as upward positionality, i.e., the attempt by a state,
2 Patrick A. Me Carthy is a Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at the European 
University Institute in Florence, Italy. This article is an edited version of a chapter of his 
Ph.D. dissertation which is entitled International Stability; Revitalising an Abused 
Concept. It was written while the author was a visiting researcher at the University of 
California, Berkeley. The author is especially grateful to the numerous senior UN officials 
who granted him interviews. For their helpful comments on earlier drafts, the author also 
wishes to thank Ernst B. Haas, Alan W. Cafruny, Sir Brian Urquhart, three anonymous 
reviewers for Global Governance, and all of his colleagues in the seminar The Future of 
the United Nations System, held at the University of California, Berkeley, during the spring 
semester of 1996.
3 R. Gilpin, War & Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1981).




























































































as a result of the relative growth of its power, to move upward in the hierarchy of 
influence.
Patrick A. Me Carthy
The second assertion concerns states’ reactions to the relative decline of 
their own power. When a state perceives that its power is not growing as fast as 
most other states in the international system—or that its power is, in fact, 
declining absolutely—it will nevertheless attempt to maintain its influence on the 
governance of the international system. In other words, it will attempt to maintain 
its position in the international hierarchy of influence. This type of behaviour will 
be referred to as downward positionality, i.e., a state’s aversion to moving 
downward in the hierarchy of influence despite the relative decline of its power.
These two types of behaviour are necessarily antagonistic since one state 
cannot move upward in the hierarchy of influence without another state being 
relegated therein. When upward and downward positionality coexist, therefore, a 
certain amount of tension is generated. Rising states become dissatisfied with 
their failure to increase their influence on the governance of the international 
system while those states they would like to dislodge become increasingly 
committed to the preservation of the status-quo. If downwardly positional states 
are successful in preserving the status-quo, the dissatisfaction of rising states may 
turn to disillusionment, tension may rise to a very high level, and conflict may 
occur. A system of international governance is stable, therefore, only if it is able 
to diffuse the tension generated by the interplay of upward and downward 
positionality and thereby avoid conflict that could lead to a breakdown of the 
system of governance.
The structure of the following analysis of the Security Council is dictated 
by this approach to conceptualising the stability of governance systems. The first 
and second parts provide evidence for the existence in the UN organisation of 
upward and downward positionality, respectively, with regard to permanent 
membership of the Security Council. The third part appraises the degree of 
tension generated within the organisation by the interplay of these opposing 
positional forces. The final part examines the mechanisms that have been 





























































































Positionality, Tension and Instability in the UN Security Council
2. Upward Positionality
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Security Council has been the focus of 
especially strong upward positionality. There are three main reasons for this, the 
first two of which concern the increased dissatisfaction of developing countries 
with the structure and membership of the Security Council and the last of which 
concerns the desire of Japan and Germany to play a bigger role in the Council’s 
decision-making.
2.1 Dissatisfaction in the Developing World
First, between 1963 and 1995, UN membership has increased from 110 to 185 
countries—an increase of over 68 percent. Since most of these new members 
come from the developing world, this increase in membership has skewed even 
more the geographical distribution of representation on the Security Council in 
favour of developed states. It has also made it more difficult for individual 
developing states to be elected as non-permanent members of the Security 
Council. Finally, it has caused a relative decrease in the representation of the 
developed world in the UN in general and has, accordingly, led the developing 
world to demand stronger representation on the Security Council.
Second, the end of the Cold War has significantly contributed to the 
dissatisfaction of developing countries with the structure and membership of the 
Security Council. During the Cold War, developing countries had less cause to 
worry that the Security Council would be used as an instrument against them by 
powerful industrialised states acting in concert. Cold war rivalries within the 
Council and their ramifications in certain regions of the Third World largely 
precluded this from happening. Since the end of the Cold War, however, rivalries 
within the Security Council have become much less intense. The result has been a 
striking reduction in the use of the veto and a significant improvement in 
decision-making capacity.
These developments have heightened fear among developing countries that 
control of the Security Council has fallen into the hands of powerful northern 
states.5 A strong foundation for this fear was provided by the 1991 Gulf War 
during which “the West demonstrated its overwhelming military superiority over 
a ‘Third World’ country... and was able to do it with full legitimacy afforded by
5 B. Russett, B. O’Neill & J. Sutterlin, "Breaking the Security Council Restructuring 
Logjam," Global Governance 2 (1996): 65-80; W. Wagner, "Der standige Sitz im 
Sicherheitsrat; Wer braucht wen: Die Deutschen diesen Sitz? Der Sicherheitsrat die 
Deutschen?," Europa Archiv 19 (1993): 533-540; E. C. Luck & T. T. Gati, "Whose 




























































































Patrick A. Me Carthy
the UN Charter.”6 In order to wrest control of the Security Council from the 
relatively unified influence of the industrialised world and so protect itself from 
similar future occurrences, the developing world demands that the Council be 
reformed so as to make it more representative and legitimate.7
2.2 Dissatisfaction in Japan and Germany
Finally, differential growth in power among states has generated a great deal of 
upward positionality in the UN. Since 1945, and even since 1965, the 
concentration of power in individual states has tended to decline as power has 
disseminated among a larger number of states. True, the most powerful states in 
the international system at the time of the Security Council’s previous reform in 
1965 remain, for the most part, the most powerful states but their power has 
declined relative to the power of other states in the system.
On the other hand, certain other states have significantly improved their 
relative standing in international relations since 1945. The two most important 
states in this respect are Japan and Germany. Both countries have moved from 
defeat and devastation to build, respectively, the second- and third-largest 
economies in the world. Furthermore, Germany, through re-unification, has 
significantly added to its population and territory. As a result of the increase in 
their relative capabilities, both countries have clearly indicated that they aspire to 
permanent representation on the Security Council.
2.3 A Coalition of Dissatisfactions
The upward positionality displayed by the developing world on the one hand and 
by Japan and Germany on the other would seem, at first glance, to be essentially 
incompatible. Developing countries in general do not wish to see increased 
representation for developed northern states on the Security Council and they are 
seriously opposed to further European representation therein. Nevertheless, these 
two sources of dissatisfaction with the status-quo have combined to create a
6 J. Ciechanski, "Restructuring of the UN Security Council," International Peacekeeping 1, 
no. 4 (1994): 414.
1 It is important to point out that, despite the impression that this very general analysis may 
give, developing countries do not hold identical views on how the Security Council should 
be reformed. On the contrary, there is a rich debate among developing countries as to how 
the membership of the Security Council should be recast. This is, nevertheless, a debate 
about the details, not the necessity, of reform. For a survey of the different reform 
preferences of developing countries, see W. Kiihne & K. Baumann, Reform des VN- 
Sicherheitsrats zum 50Jahrigen Jubildum: Auswertung und Analyse der Stellungnahmen 
der Mitgliedstaaten im Uberblick (Ebenhausen/Isartal: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik; 




























































































Positionality, Tension and Instability in the UN Security Council
strong concerted push for reform with the dual aims, generally speaking, of 
permanent representation for Japan and Germany and greater representation for 
the developing south. This unlikely coalition of interests has formed due to the 
fact that, on the one hand, Japan and Germany need the support of the developing 
world if they are to succeed in becoming permanent members of the Security 
Council and, on the other, that developing countries need the support of Japan 
and Germany to ensure that the debate on Security Council reform maintains its 
current momentum.
Japan and Germany have found it necessary to court the developing world 
since without the support of a sizeable number of developing countries, neither 
has a chance of generating the two-thirds majority support necessary under 
Article 108 to amend the Charter in order to allow them to become permanent 
members of the Security Council. As a result, both Japan and Germany have 
incorporated within their respective campaigns for permanent membership the 
imperative of improving upon the representation of developing countries on the 
Council. Japan supports the inclusion as permanent members of “such qualified 
countries as may be selected by agreement from Asia, Africa and Latin America 
based on judgement of their capacity and willingness to assume global 
responsibilities.”8 Germany supports granting permanent seats to an unspecified 
number of countries from the developing world. Its preferred reform solution is 
the so-called “two-plus” formula by which the permanent membership of the 
Security Council would be expanded to include Germany and Japan (two) and 
some other unspecified countries from Africa, Latin America, and Asia (plus).9
The developing world needs the support of Japan and Germany, on the 
other hand, because without their active involvement in the debate on Security 
Council reform, no progress on the matter is likely to be made and the debate is 
likely to loose its current momentum. A glance at the recent history of reform 
debate within the UN suffices to support this contention. The topic of Security 
Council reform re-emerged during the 34th General Assembly in 1980 but
° D. Lau, "Japan Backs Wider Expansion of UNSC," The Daily Yomiuri (February 10, 
1995). See also “Statement to the United Nations' 50th General Assembly by H.E. Mr. 
Hisashi Owada, Representative of Japan, on item 47: Question of equitable representation 
on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters,” (New 
York: Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, November 13, 1995).
9 “Statement by Ambassador Detlev Graf zu Rantzau, Permanent Representative of Germany 
to the United Nations, to the United Nations' 49th General Assembly. Agenda item 33: 
Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security 





























































































Patrick A. Me Carthy
“lingered hopelessly for several years in General Assembly commissions.”10 1In 
marked contrast, the beginning of the current dynamic debate on Security Council 
reform coincided with indications by Japan and Germany in the early 1990s that 
both would pursue permanent membership. Japan and Germany were the 
catalysts for, and continue to be the main engine of, the current reform process. 
Without their engagement, the debate would either never have reached its current 
stage or would have taken significantly longer to do so.
2.4 The German and Japanese Campaigns for Permanent Membership
The permanent membership campaigns conducted by Japan and Germany have 
been aimed at winning support from the general UN membership, on the one 
hand, and from the five permanent members of the Security Council, on the other. 
Different, and not altogether compatible, strategies have been used in each case. 
To win the support of the general UN membership, both countries have been 
careful to communicate their desire for permanent representation on the Security 
Council in ways that avoid the perception that they are conducting independent, 
aggressive campaigns. This strategy has involved relying on the solicitation of 
other states and on playing down the military responsibility normally associated 
with permanent membership.
To win the support of the permanent members of the Security Council, on 
the other hand, Japan and Germany have taken steps towards bolstering their 
international military responsibility. By doing so, they have attempted to deflect 
the complaints of some permanent members that constitutional barriers against 
foreign troop deployments in place in both countries would make them privileged 
permanent members of the Security Council insofar as they would enjoy strong 
decision-making influence without playing a corresponding role in international 
military affairs.
Both Japan and Germany have long been sensitive to the argument that 
permanent membership of the Security Council has as a prerequisite a high 
degree of international military responsibility that includes the ability to 
participate in UN peacekeeping activities. Both countries agree with the opinion 
often expressed by UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali that no formal link exists 
between permanent membership of the Security Council and peacekeeping 
responsibility." They concur, however, with the opinion of the current permanent
'0  J. Ciechanski, "Restructuring of the UN Security Council," International Peacekeeping 1, 
no. 4 (1994): 414.
11 "Ghali Less Sure About Early U.N. Security Council Reform,” Kyodo News International, 




























































































membership that a moral link does exist between the two.12 For this reason, both 
Japan and Germany have taken steps to facilitate their participation in UN 
peacekeeping operations in order to increase their capacity to accept greater 
international military responsibility and thereby improve their chances of being 
accepted by the current permanent membership as permanent members with full 
responsibilities.
2.4.1 Japan and International Military Responsibility
In June 1993, after almost two years of acrimonious debate, the Japanese Diet 
passed an International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCL) which allows Japanese 
troops to take part in UN peacekeeping operations subject to five essential 
conditions; (1) that a cease-fire agreement is already in place, (2) that the parties 
to the conflict have given their consent to the deployment of peacekeeping troops 
and to the participation of Japanese troops, (3) that the peacekeeping force 
maintains impartiality, (4) that the use of weapons is limited to the minimum 
necessary to protect the lives of Japanese armed forces and (5) that the Japanese 
government may withdraw its contingent should any of the other conditions cease 
to apply.13
At present, Japanese troops deployed abroad may not participate in 
operations that may involve the use of force for purposes other than self-defence. 
They are limited to providing logistical support to other UN units and to 
participating in civilian peacekeeping activities. Under the IPCL, Japan has sent 
Japanese electoral observers to Angola, Cambodia and El Salvador; it has 
deployed military observers, civilian police and a 600-strong construction unit in 
Cambodia, and has also sent staff officers and a movement control unit to 
Mozambique. Most recently, it has deployed self-defence forces to the United 
Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) operating in the Golan 
Heights.
While these are undoubtedly important peacekeeping contributions, they 
do not significantly add to Japan’s share of international military responsibility. 
Foreign Minister Kono made it clear that, even with a fully operational IPCL, 
Japan will be unable to participate in peace-enforcement operations as envisioned 
by Boutros-Ghali.14 According to Mr. Kono, Japan is only willing to fulfil its 
responsibilities as a permanent member “in accordance with its basic philosophy
Positionality, Tension and Instability in the UN Security Council
12 Interviews, New York (February 5-7, 1996).
'2  T. Susumu, "Japan's Contribution to UN Peacekeeping," Social Science Japan 6 (1996): 7- 
10.





























































































Patrick A. Mc Carth\
regarding international contributions, including the non-resort to the use of force 
prohibited by its constitution”.15
However, Japan’s inability to participate in military-style peace- 
enforcement operations does not deter it from continuing with its campaign for 
permanent membership since it argues that the resources needed to contribute to 
international peace and security in the modem world differ from those needed in 
the past. According to Japan, nowadays such a contribution depends more and 
more on economic and non-military factors.16
2.4,2 Germany and International Military Responsibility
Like Japan, Germany has also taken steps towards improving its international 
military responsibility. Unlike Japan, however, it has largely succeeded in doing 
so. In order to reinforce the fact that the German campaign for permanent 
membership had begun, Foreign Minister Kinkel told the 47th General Assembly 
in September 1992 that Germany was determined to amend its constitution to 
allow its troops to participate in UN peacekeeping and peacemaking operations in 
order to end “any discrepancy between our verbal commitment to peace and 
human rights and our active involvement in their defence.”17 It was not Kinkel’s 
active petitioning, however, but the dissatisfaction of opposition parties with the 
use of German troops in Bosnia and Somalia that eventually led to the loosening 
of the constitutional restrictions. Neither was it necessary to amend the 
Grundgesetz. A more liberal interpretation of its provisions by the German 
Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) sufficed to give the German government more 
freedom in deploying its armed forces abroad.
In effect, the German government is now in a position to deploy its troops 
world-wide provided they participate in UN-sponsored multilateral operations. 
Under normal circumstances, the prior support of the Bundestag is required for 
such deployments. However, the FCC ruling also allows the German government, 
in cases of particular emergency, to deploy its troops first and seek parliamentary 
support later.18 As a consequence of this new-found freedom in the area of
'5  “Statement by Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono at the 50th Session of the UN 
General Assembly” (September 26, 1995 [http://www.nttls.co.jp/infomofa/press/fm/ 
92850th. html]).
16 UN Doc. A/48/264: 54. See also P. J. Katzenstein, “Culture, Norms, and Japanese 
Security,” Social Science Japan 7 (August 1996): 9-11.
17 H. Pick, "Allies Resist German Push for Big-Power Seat at UN," The Guardian 
(September 25, 1992): 8.
18 Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 12. Juli 1994 zu Auslandseinsatzen der 
Bundeswehr (Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung; Referat AuBen- 




























































































Positionality, Tension and Instability in the UN Security Council
foreign troop deployment, Germany has declared itself ready to provide “stand-by 
forces” to the UN for use in peacekeeping operations. These will be established, 
according to Generalleutnant Manfred Eisele of the UN department for 
peacekeeping operations, after the restructuring of the Bundeswehr is completed; 
probably early in the next century.19
At present, Germany is deploying soldiers, military observers, civilian 
police, or medical personnel to UN operations in Iraq, Bosnia, Georgia, Angola, 
Kuwait and Liberia. Of these, 4,000 soldiers and 150 state and federal police 
officers are deployed in the former Yugoslavia. Thus, Germany has been largely 
successful in increasing its international military responsibility. Unlike Japan, its 
troops may now carry out multilateral military operations in support of Security 
Council resolutions.
Both Germany and Japan, therefore, have attempted to increase their 
international military responsibility in order to strengthen their respective cases 
for permanent membership of the Security Council. In this respect, Germany has 
met with more success than has Japan. Nevertheless, the actions of both countries 
clearly indicate that each aspires to a greater share in the governance of the 
international system. The current climate in the UN, therefore, is characterised by 
the strong upward positionality of Japan and Germany and, to a lesser extent, by 
the upward positionality of developing countries who wish to see their increased 
representation in the UN organisation translated into greater decision-making 
influence.




























































































Patrick A. Me Carthv
3. Downward Positionality
The same factors that have led to the upward positionality of Japan, Germany and 
the developing world have also led the current permanent members of the 
Security Council to display strong downward positionality; i.e., to behave so as to 
protect their privileged position in the UN’s hierarchy of influence.
Even before Japan and Germany made public their intention to campaign 
for permanent seats, the permanent members were careful not to encourage 
debate on the question of altering the membership of the Security Council. For 
example, in December 1991, Britain, as chair of the Security Council, smoothed 
the way for the Russian Federation to take over the Soviet Union’s permanent 
seat despite the fact that the process by which this was achieved is suspect under 
international law.20 Britain, France and the US feared that indecisiveness in 
appointing the Soviet Union’s successor would lead to a deeper questioning by 
UN member states of the validity of Council membership and, therefore, 
preferred a quick, if legally dubious, solution to a more protracted, politically 
sensitive one. The inheritance by Russia of the Soviet Union’s permanent seat did 
not meet with much opposition from the UN membership at large, suggesting that 
the permanent members were successful in expediting the process and, thus, 
minimising debate on it.
3.1 Initial Opposition to Reforming the Security Council
When Germany and Japan made official their intentions to push for permanent 
membership, the reaction of most of the permanent members was negative. 
Certain among them offered various reasons as to why the addition of extra 
permanent members to the Security Council was not to be desired. France 
focused on the detrimental effects that enlargement would have on the 
effectiveness of Security Council decision-making.21 British Prime Minister, John 
Major, insisted that “Security Council reform is neither necessary nor desirable”22 
and in a UN report Britain expressed its satisfaction with the way the Council
20 Y. Z. Blum, "Russia Takes Over the Soviet Union's Seat at the United Nations," European 
Journal o f International Law 3, no. 2 (1992): 354-361; T. Daley, Russia's "Continuation" 
o f the Soviet Security Council Membership and Prospective Russian Policies toward the 
United Nations (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1992 [P-7778-RGS]). This is not the first 
occasion, however, on which the representation of a permanent member has been altered. 
In 1973, the communist government of mainland China took over the Chinese permanent 
seat from the nationalist Chinese government in Taiwan.
21 UN Doc. A/48/264: 41; M. Walker, "France Plays Nuclear Card Over UN Veto," The 
Guardian (June 11, 1993): 24; "United Nations: ‘Big Five’ Split Over Security Council 
Reforms," Inter Press Service (August 3, 1993).




























































































was operating and warned against any initiative that might interfere with its 
effectiveness.23 Both France and the UK also played the nuclear card in their 
opposition to permanent membership for Japan and Germany. French UN 
Ambassador Merimee referred to the “unwritten rules” surrounding the nuclear 
status of all current permanent members and a British official argued in June 1993 
that “the nuclear status lurks understood in the background.”24
The United States, on the other hand, has been an consistent supporter 
since the early 1990s of adding Germany and Japan to the permanent membership 
of the Security Council. As early as January 1992, US President Bush expressed 
support for the idea that Japan be granted a permanent seat on the Security 
Council. During his presidential campaign in 1992, Bill Clinton also expressed 
support for making both Japan and Germany permanent members. The Clinton 
administration has since maintained this position. In 1993, U.S. Ambassador to 
the UN, Madeleine Albright, made it official that adding Germany and Japan to 
the Security Council had become an integral part of U.S. proposals to reform the 
UN.25 “It was time the Security Council reflected the world of the 1990s and not 
that of 1945,” she explained,26 adding that US support for expanding permanent 
membership to include Japan and Germany was based on the US conviction that 
both countries had gained economic and political significance and were able to 
contribute to the promotion of international peace and order.27
US support for the addition of Japan and Germany as permanent members 
of the Security Council does not correspond with the behaviour to be expected 
from a downwardly positional state. Instead of jealously guarding its privileged 
position in the upper echelons of the UN’s hierarchy of influence—a strategy that 
both Britain and France initially followed—the US has actively supported the 
granting of additional shares in the governance of the international system to 
Japan and Germany. How can this deviant behaviour be explained? One 
explanation might be that, because the US is still the most powerful state in the 
international system, it feels less threatened by the aspirations of Japan and 
Germany than do, for example, Britain and France who fear that their influence in 
the UN organisation may be eclipsed if Germany and Japan are granted 
permanent membership. Another explanation might be that US support of
Positionality, Tension and Instability in the UN Security Council
23 UN Doc. A/48/264: 90-91.
24 M. Walker, "France Plays Nuclear Card Over UN Veto," The Guardian (June 11, 1993): 
24.
25 UN Doc. A/48/264: 91-92.
2(3 M. Walker, "France Plays Nuclear Card Over UN Veto," The Guardian (June 11, 1993): 
24.





























































































Patrick A. Me Carthy
Japanese and German permanent membership is a manifestation of the desire of a 
declining hegemon to underwrite its global activity by granting additional 
decision-making powers to the like-minded, rich countries.
3.2 Subsequent Acquiescence to the Necessity o f Limited Reform
Britain and France hoped that their strict initial opposition to reforming the 
Security Council would quell interest in the topic. As soon as it became apparent, 
however, that a major debate on Council reform was developing within the 
United Nations, both realised that their opposition to reform would soon become 
untenable in the face of strong support for reform among the general UN 
membership. Faced with this dilemma, both modified their official positions and 
declared themselves open, in principle, to the idea of extending the membership 
of the Council to reflect both the increase in membership of the UN and the 
changes that had taken place in international relations since 1945. France and the 
UK began publicly to support Japan and Germany as future permanent members 
of the Security Council. Both reasoned that, if reform was inevitable, it would be 
best to add those countries with whom positive relations already existed.28
The “shift in emphasis” of the British position was particularly abrupt. 
During the course of the same July 1993 G7 summit meeting at which John Major 
had expressed his cautious opposition to Japanese permanent membership, 
Foreign Secretary Hurd stated that Britain come to accept the need for Security 
Council reform and that, if agreement on the matter were reached, Japan and 
Germany would be the “natural beneficiaries” of permanent seats.29 This 
statement marked the beginning of a new British policy on Security Council 
reform that has since remained steadfast. As if to underline the drastic change in 
British policy since the early ‘90s, John Major, speaking before the 50th 
anniversary commemorative session of the General Assembly on October 23, 
1995, asked “should the Security Council be reformed?” and answered “I believe 
it should. The subject has been on the agenda for too long. It raises difficult 
questions; but the issues are clear, and decisions are needed.”30 In the words of
28 Interviews, New York (February 5-7, 1996).
29 "G7 Summit: Britain Starts to Bow towards the Inevitable: Hurd and Major Give First 
Signs of Accepting German and Japanese Claims to Seats on UN Security Council," The 
Independent (July 9, 1993): 10.
20 UN 50th Anniversary, Statement by British Prime Minister, John Major, to the Special 
Commemorative Meeting of the General Assembly on the Occasion of the 50th 





























































































Positionality, Tension and Instability in the UN Security Council
one British UN official, the UK has become an “enthusiastic convert” to the idea 
of Security Council reform.31
Change in the official French position on Security Council reform was just 
as striking. On the eve of his visit to Tokyo on March 29, 1994, French Foreign 
Minster, Alain Juppé, expressed support for the idea of extending permanent 
membership, with full responsibilities, to Germany and Japan stating that France 
considered it a “necessity” to enlarge the Council and that “il est donc naturel de 
donner un siège à L’Allemagne et au Japon.”32 Addressing the 49th General 
Assembly, Mr. Juppé was the only foreign minister to refer specifically to Japan 
and Germany in the context of Security Council reform.
Despite the fundamental change in its position, however, France is still of 
the opinion that neither Germany nor Japan are yet ready to assume the 
responsibilities of permanent membership. It is not satisfied with the level of 
international military responsibility that either has assumed thus far. According to 
one senior French UN official, further change—most likely constitutional—is 
necessary in both countries if international military responsibility is to be brought 
to a level commensurate with the responsibilities of permanent members of the 
Security Council.33 France’s current support for the permanent membership of 
Japan and Germany is, therefore, based on the priority that each has placed on 
increasing international military responsibility and on the steps that each has 
already taken towards achieving this goal. France’s support, however, is 
conditional upon the achievement of this goal.
China and the Russian Federation did not actively oppose the idea of 
German and Japanese permanent membership from the outset but preferred 
instead to urge great caution and reserve when dealing with such an important 
question. China agrees that there is a need to expand the membership of the 
Security Council “in an appropriate manner when the time is ripe”34 and is 
concerned that any reform should not have an adverse impact on the effectiveness 
of the Council. It foresees a long, careful process of reform the end result of 
which will be reached by “broad consensus and universal acceptance of the 
Member States.”35
31 Interviews, New York (February 5-7, 1996).
32 "L'avenir des Nations unies: Alain Juppé favorable à un droit de veto pour le Japon et 
l'Allemagne au Conseil de sécurité," Le Monde (March 29, 1994).
33 Interviews, New York (February 5-7, 1996).
34 UN Doc. A/48/264: 18.
35 UN Doc. A/48/264: 19. See also "China Calls for Prudence in Security Council Reform," 
Xinhua General Overseas News Service (July 1, 1993); and L. Jianxiong, "Nations Push 




























































































Patrick A. Me Carthy
Likewise, the Russian Federation has approached the question of reforming 
the Security Council with a great deal of caution. It recognises that changes in the 
international system over the past fifty years have led to the need for reform of 
the United Nations system as a whole and that “expansion of the Security Council 
should be considered in a wider context of the general task of adapting the United 
Nations to realities of today.”36 Russia’s support is tempered with reservations, 
however. It has argued that any reform of the Security Council should strengthen 
its new-found effectiveness and has gone as far as to argue that the UN “cannot 
afford to engage in an overhaul of machinery which not only is not broken but is 
in fact in good working order.”37 It has also suggested various ways in which the 
operation of the Security Council might be improved without having to resort to 
expanding its membership.38
In sum, despite the fact that all permanent members have acquiesced to the 
necessity of limited reform of the Security Council, their motivations for doing so 
and the general reserved nature of their support clearly indicate characteristics of 
downward positionality. All permanent members recognise that the reform debate 
has achieved a critical momentum within the UN and that opposing the general 
will of the UN membership by refusing to countenance reform is not a viable 
course of action . Their support of reform, for the most part, is motivated more by 
a desire to make the most out of a difficult situation by salvaging as many of their 
privileges as possible intact than by a belief that reforming the Security Council is 
a virtuous goal in its own right. Permanent members have not, on the whole, been 
willing collaborators in the reform process. Rather, the have been reluctant 
participants in a process driven by the ambitions of rising states.
4. Tension
The interplay of the upward positionality of Japan and Germany, on the one hand, 
and the downward positionality of the permanent members of the Security 
Council, on the other, has generated a significant amount of tension in the United 
Nations organisation. This tension manifests itself, in increasing order of
China’s cautious position on Security Council reform is also influenced by its “unofficial” 
opposition to Japanese permanent membership.
3(3 Statement by Deputy Permanent Representative o f the Russian Federation to the United 
Nations, Yuri V. Fedotov, at the Meeting o f the UN General Assembly on the Question of 
Equitable Representation and Expansion o f the Security Council, November 15, 1995, 
(New York: Russian Federation, Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Press Release 
No. 33, November 16, 1995 [Unofficial Translation]).
37 UN Doc. A/48/264: 82.




























































































Positionality, Tension and Instability in the UN Security Council
importance, in the different levels of urgency with which various states view the 
necessity of reforming the Security Council, in the acrimonious debate on the 
future of the veto, and in the major disagreements over how many permanent and 
non-permanent seats should be added to the Council and who should fill them.
4.1 The Urgency o f Reform
Tension is generated by the interplay of the different degrees of urgency that 
states attach to the need for reform. Some states consider reform to be essential, 
some to be necessary and others merely consider it hypothetically desirable. The 
urgency attached by states to achieving reform tends to correlate with whether 
they are attempting to improve their position in the UN’s hierarchy of influence or 
to maintain their position therein. On the one hand, states displaying upward 
positionality—Japan and Germany, for example—tend to attach great urgency to 
achieving reform. The German Permanent Representative, for example, called for 
“substantial achievements” to be made on the subject of reforming the Security 
Council during the 50th General Assembly, warning that “we must make good 
use of the momentum created. It will not last forever.”39 Likewise, Japan sought 
to begin the reform process by 199540 and, when that deadline passed, pushed to 
resolve the question of Security Council reform by September 1996.41
On the other hand, states displaying downward positionality—the 
permanent members of the Security Council—tend to approach the subject of 
reform in a more casual manner and tend also to foresee the process of reform 
taking longer to complete. China, for example, foresees a long process of reform 
characterised by prudence and caution and by the aim of achieving unanimous 
agreement. Likewise, the Russian Federation has stressed that it will co-operate 
in the reform debate so long as “any steps taken in this field are gradual and 
decided on by consensus, after general agreement has been reached in the
39 Statement by Ambassador Tono Eitel, Permanent Representative o f Germany to the 
United Nations, to the United Nations' 50th General Assembly. Agenda item 47: Question 
o f equitable representation on and increase in the membership o f the Security Council 
and related matters (New York: Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations, 
November 13, 1995).
40 UN Doc. A/48/264.
4 ' Statement by Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono at the 50th Session o f the UN 
General Assembly [http://www.nttls.co.jp/infomofa/press/fm/92850th. html]; Statement to 
the United Nations' 50th General Assembly by H.E. Mr. Hisashi Owada, Representative 
o f Japan, on item 47: Question o f equitable representation on and increase in the 
membership o f the Security Council and related matters (New York: Permanent Mission 
of Japan to the United Nations, November 13, 1995); "Japan Calls for Reform of UNSC by 




























































































Patrick A. Me Carthy
Council and universally acceptable criteria have been worked out.”42 In the same 
vein, British Foreign Secretary Hurd admitted in 1993, that “this is a huge debate 
and it will go on for a long time... An outcome will be very hard and slow to 
reach.”43
Once more, the US constitutes somewhat of an exception in this regard. As 
a permanent member of the Security Council, it has an obvious interest in 
maintaining its privileged position in the institutional hierarchy. Nevertheless, it is 
most concerned that reform of the Security Council be carried out quickly. The 
US Assistant Secretary for International Organisations, for example, has advised 
that “the [Security] Council should not proceed too far into its second half- 
century without updating its membership”44 and the US does not rule out that 
some major agreement on reform is possible before the end of 1996.45
4.2 The Veto
A significant amount of tension is also generated by the controversy surrounding 
the question of how best to deal with the veto in the context of Security Council 
reform. Generally speaking, four opposing positions dominate the debate 
according to which the right of veto should be (1) phased out altogether, (2) 
limited in scope, (3) retained by the existing permanent members but not 
extended to new permanent members, or (4) extended to new permanent 
members.
The first proposal, that the veto should be abolished altogether,46 is a non­
starter since all permanent members have indicated that they are not willing to 
relinquish their right of veto. From the point of view of the P-5, the function of 
the veto has not changed since 1945. It still fulfils the task of preventing 
concerted action being taken against a permanent member of the Security
42 UN Doc. A/48/264: 83.
42 L. Doyle, "Hurd Warning Over ‘Slide into Disorder’: Foreign Secretary Backs Imperial 
UN and Defends Britain's Global Role to Justify Permanent Security Council Seat," The 
Independent (January, 28, 1993): 1.
44 G. F. Ward Jr., The United States and the United Nations, Address by Assistant Secretary 
for International Organizations at Chapman University, Orange County, California 
(February 10, 1995 [gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu:70/0F-l%3A19376%3A95/02/10]).
45 Interviews, New York (February 5-7, 1996).
4f> For examples of this proposal, see Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report o f the 
Commission on Global Governance (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); 
W. Hoffmann, United Nations Security Council Reform and Restructuring (Livingston, 
N.J.: The Center for U.N. Reform and Education [Monograph It 14], 1994); K. L. Sellen, 
"The United Nations Security Council Veto in the New World Order," Military Law 




























































































Positionality, Tension and Instability in the UN Security Council
Council. The threat of veto—or the “hidden veto”—is also a powerful negotiation 
tool. It can deter states from bringing certain issues to the negotiation table in the 
first place—an example is the Soviet Union’s promise to veto reform proposals in 
the early 1960s—or, once negotiation has commenced, it can be used to force 
important concessions. Following the end of the Cold War, increased use of the 
hidden veto has provided permanent members with the added advantage of being 
able to exercise veto power without having to be exposed to the indignation of the 
international community. Without the acquiescence of the permanent members in 
the matter of abolishing the veto, therefore, it remains essentially unassailable for 
the simple reason that each permanent member has a veto over the question of 
abolishing the veto. As one Russian UN official put it, until the p-5 agree to 
contemplate phasing out the veto, it is not at all productive to discuss that 
option.47
Proposals to limit the scope of the veto by restricting the range of issues to 
which it applies have also been made.48 It has been suggested, for example, that 
the range of matters treated as procedural—to which the veto does not apply—be 
expanded so as more closely to comply with the spirit of the Charter. One 
concrete expression of this proposal could be the non-application of the veto to 
the election of the Secretary General or to the admission of new members. 
Another popular proposal is that the veto not be applied to action under Chapter
VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) but restricted instead to action under Chapter
VII (Enforcement Action).'
There are several problems associated with this proposal that seriously 
impinge upon its chances of success. First, although only three vetoes have been 
cast since 1988, recent evidence suggests that permanent members are not willing 
to accept restrictions on their use of the veto. Russia, for example, cast one of 
these three vetoes on a minor budgetary matter49 “mainly to demonstrate that it 
was still willing to use its privilege and thus reinforce the credibility of its
47 Interviews, New York (February 5-7, 1996).
48 For examples of this type of proposal, see The United Nations in its Second Half-Century 
(Yale University: The Report of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the 
United Nations [http://www.library.yale.edu/un/unhome.htm]); and Reform o f the Security 
Council, Memorandum submitted to the president of the UN General assembly; Chair of 
the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and 
Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, from the International Peace Academy 
and The Stanley Foundation (May 20, 1994).
49 Russia cast this veto in May of 1993 killing a resolution aimed at restructuring UN 
peacekeeping in Cyprus. Moscow opposed joining with other UN members in paying its 
share (less than $2 million) to support a smaller peacekeeping force that would have taken 
over from a larger force financed by Britain. See J. Bone, “Russia Vetoes Plan to Cut UN 




























































































Patrick A. Me Carthy
threat.”50 Second, any such restriction on the use of the veto would have to be 
voluntarily accepted by all of the permanent members. Since compliance with the 
restriction would be at the discretion of each permanent member, it is unlikely 
that veto use would be restricted for longer than was convenient for a given 
permanent member. Finally, voluntarily restricting the use of the veto would 
involve relinquishing the application of the hidden veto in negotiations that fall 
outside of the scope of Chapter VII, seriously curtailing the negotiating leverage 
of the permanent members. It is unlikely that the permanent members will agree 
to restrict their own influence.
The proposal that veto power be retained by existing permanent members 
but not extended to new permanent members is, understandably, vehemently 
opposed by both Japan and Germany. Japan is acutely aware of the negotiation 
leverage associated with the right of veto and is against the creation, as part of an 
overall strategy to reform the Security Council, of a new class of permanent 
membership without veto powers.51 Likewise, Germany’s Chancellor Kohl has 
clearly stated that his country would not accept a permanent seat on the Security 
Council if it did not come with all usual rights, including the right of veto.52 The 
Acting German Permanent Representative explained that, “the right to veto is per 
se not an objective for us. But our bottom line is clear: If Germany... shall 
become permanent member of the Security Council this has to be on an equal 
footing with the other permanent members, without discrimination, i.e. with the 
same rights and the same obligations.”53 If Germany were to achieve permanent 
membership of the Security Council without veto rights, so the argument goes, 
the German government would find it extremely difficult to explain to its citizens
5(1 B. Russett, B. O’Neill & J. Sutterlin, "Breaking the Security Council Restructuring 
Logjam," Global Governance 2 (1996): 65-80.
51 “Japan is not enthusiastic about proposals to establish a new category of membership of the 
Security Council, be it in the form of semi-permanent membership or otherwise” (Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs document [http://www.nttls.co.jp/infomofa/unj/ reform.html]).
52 "Kohl Opposes Taking UNSC Seat Without Veto Power," Kyodo News Service, Japan
Economic Newswire (July 9, 1993). See also Europe and the UN: Focal Points for 
German Foreign Policy, Report Marking the Sixth Anniversary of Germany Unification 
(October 3, 1996 [http://www.auswaertiges-amt.govemment.de/de/what_new/
p960918a.htm]).
53 Modalities fo r  Bringing Change into Effect and Consideration o f Related Charter 
Amendments, Statement by Ambassador Dr. Gerhard Henze, Acting Permanent 
Representative of Germany to the United Nations, to the Open-Ended Working Group on 
the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the 





























































































Positionality, Tension and Instability in the UN Security Council
why Germany was being treated differently than, for example, France or the 
UK.54
The proposal that the right of veto be extended to any new permanent 
members of the Security Council is supported, therefore, by Japan and Germany. 
A number of permanent members have also expressed support for this option. 
Former French Foreign Minister, Alain Juppé, has underlined that “Les nouveaux 
membres permanents devront jouir des droits et assumer les responsabilités de 
leur charge.”55 Likewise, British Foreign Minister, Douglas Hurd, stressed that 
“any extension of the permanent membership should be on a normal basis, that it 
to say, new permanent members should have the same rights as existing 
permanent members.”56 Russia has also expressed its support for extending veto 
rights to new permanent members.57
It would seem at first glance that by supporting the extension of veto-rights 
to new permanent members, these permanent members are collaborating in the 
dilution of their own influence. It is not difficult to understand, however, why 
they are following this course of action. Extending veto-privileges to states that 
achieve permanent membership of the Security Council is, in fact, in the best 
interests of the current permanent members. If they were to refuse to do so, the 
veto would lose most of the scant legitimacy it has left since it would essentially 
become a relic of the past,58 attributable only to the historical fact of having been 
an original permanent member.
For examples of this argument, see W. Kiihne, "Erweiterung und Reform des UN- 
Sicherheitsrats: keine weltpolitische Nebensache," Europa Archiv 24 (1994): 685-692; and 
W. Kiihne & K. Baumann, Reform des VN-Sicherheitsrats zum SOJdhrigen Jubilaum: 
Auswertung und Analyse der Stellungnahmen der Mitgliedstaaten im Überblick
(Ebenhausen/Isartal: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik; Forschungsinstitut für
internationale Politik und Sicherheit [SWP-AP 2919], July 1995).
55 "L'avenir des Nations unies: Alain Juppé favorable à un droit de veto pour le Japon et 
l'Allemagne au Conseil de sécurité," Le Monde (March 29, 1994).
56 "Britain and France Reaffirm Support for Permanent Membership for Germany and Japan," 
The Daily Yomiuri (September 30, 1994): 2.
55 W. Kiihne & K. Baumann, Reform des VN-Sicherheitsrats zum 50Jahrigen Jubilaum: 
Auswertung und Analyse der Stellungnahmen der Mitgliedstaaten im Überblick
(Ebenhausen/Isartal: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik; Forschungsinstitut für
internationale Politik und Sicherheit [SWP-AP 2919], July 1995).
58 See also J. Ciechanski, "Restructuring of the UN Security Council," International 




























































































Patrick A. Me Carthv
4.3 Adding Permanent and Non-permanent Seats
Most tension is generated, however, by the question of how to expand the 
membership of the Security Council. On this issue, broad agreement exists on 
several general points but deep-seated disagreement plagues specific reform 
proposals. For example, there is broad agreement among UN member states that 
the number of seats on the Security Council should be increased. A sizeable 
number of UN member states, including most of the permanent members, also 
agree that Japan and Germany should have permanent representation, albeit on 
certain conditions. Furthermore, there is widespread agreement that any reform 
should improve the representation of Asia, Africa and Latin America. This is 
about as far as agreement stretches, however. On the subject of how many 
permanent and non-permanent seats should be added, and on who should fill 
them, broad disagreement reigns.
The majority of tension in the reform debate is generated by differences of 
opinion over how best to reconcile two broad areas of agreement—that Germany 
and Japan should become permanent members and that developing countries 
should be better represented. This is the problem at the heart of the reform 
debate. Developing countries, while generally supporting the permanent 
membership campaigns of Japan and Germany, have long argued that permanent 
membership of the Security Council should not be limited to industrialised 
countries of the north. The P-5, on the other hand, are generally supportive—with 
the possible exceptions of China and Russia—of the idea of adding Japan and 
Germany as permanent members but are not supportive—with the possible 
exception of China—of the idea of adding developing countries as permanent 
members of the Security Council. From the point of view of those permanent 
members that are both rich and industrialised—the US, Britain and France—there 
is good reason for this since:
Germany and Japan vote regularly with other rich industrial states in the General 
Assembly, and in the security Council when they happen to hold nonpermanent seats. 
So long as their alignment in international politics holds relatively constant..., their 
acquisition of permanent (and veto-wielding) membership would not fundamentally 
alter the balance of political forces on the council. Anything they might wish to veto 
would probably be opposed by the United Kingdom, France, and/or the United States 
anyway. However, giving such membership to members of the Nonaligned Movement 
(for example, India, Nigeria, or to a lesser degree Brazil) would greatly complicate 
efforts to pass resolutions [since] ...a new nonaligned permanent member would be 
likely to have substantive views quite different from those of the developed northern 
countries...59 59
59 B. Russett, B. O’Neill & J. Sutterlin, "Breaking the Security Council Restructuring 




























































































Positionality, Tension and Instability in the UN Security Council
For China and Russia, on the other hand, the temptation does exist to 
loosen the grip of rich western states on the Security Council by supporting the 
permanent representation of developing countries, although neither has openly 
supported such a course of action. For China, having developing countries 
permanently represented on the Council would provide it with allies who could 
support it in its ideological struggle with the West. China’s approach to date, 
however, suggests that it prefers no reform at all even to reform that might 
include the permanent representation of developing countries. Its vague and 
general statements, its conviction that debate on reform will carry on for a very 
long time, and, most important, its insistence that agreement on reform must be 
arrived at by consensus—a most unlikely development—all point to its 
overwhelming preference for maintaining the status-quo.
Russia, likewise, has good reason to prefer the status-quo. Its permanent 
seat on the Security Council is a relic of the Superpower status enjoyed by the 
Soviet Union. It elevates Russia to a formal position of international influence 
that belies its de facto capabilities and ensures that, despite its relative decline, it 
retains a strong voice in world affairs. Were Russia to risk, in the words of 
Kozyrev, turning the Security Council “into a mini General Assembly”60 by 
supporting the permanent representation of developing countries, it would be a 
conspirator in the sabotage of the one institution that provides it with 
disproportionate influence in international politics. Such a course of action would 
be tantamount to political suicide.
The interplay of upward and downward positionality, therefore, has 
generated tension in three main areas—in the debate over how urgently the 
Security Council needs to be reformed, in the debate over the future of the veto, 
and in the debate over the number of permanent and non-permanent seats that 
should be added to the Council. To different extents in each of these debates, the 
preferences of upwardly and downwardly positional states stand in opposition to 
one another.
5. Diffusing the Tension
How has the UN organisation fared in diffusing this tension? The UN does not 
possess a formal review mechanism that periodically assesses the need for 
reforming the UN’s hierarchy of influence in light of significant shifts in the 
distribution of power among states. However, the UN organisation has made use
6° D. Gornostayev, "Kozyrev is Busy; Russian Foreign Minister Continues to Participate in 




























































































Patrick A. Me Carthy
of a separate mechanism—its power to appoint working groups—in order to 
tackle the problem of diffusing tension and reaching agreement on reform. 
Despite significant short-comings in the procedural and decision-making rules 
governing the operation of the UN working-group established to examine the 
issue of Security Council reform, it has succeeded in making an important 
contribution to advancing the reform debate.
5.1 The Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG)
Although the question of expanding the membership of the Security Council has 
been raised intermittently since the Council underwent its last, and only, reform in 
1965, it was only given official institutional recognition on December 11, 1992, 
when the 47th General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 47/62 on the 
“question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the 
Security Council.” In accordance with the resolution, Boutros-Ghali submitted a 
report to the 48th General Assembly containing details of the reform preferences 
of about one third of UN member states.61 During the same session, the General 
Assembly established an “Open-ended Working Group on the Question of 
Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security 
Council” (OEWG), consisting of all UN member states, to consider all aspects of 
Security Council reform.
The OEWG met on 22 occasions during the 48th General Assembly but 
submitted only a two-page progress report at the end of the session. Needless to 
say, little progress had been made. The report stated, in essence, that “there was 
a convergence of views that the membership of the Security Council should be 
enlarged” but that “there was also agreement that the scope and nature of such 
enlargement require further discussion.”62
During the course of the 49th General Assembly, the co-chairmen of the 
OEWG—Wilhelm Breitenstein of Finland and Nitya Pibulsonggram of 
Thailand—produced, on their own initiative, a “compendium of observations” on 
Security Council reform.63 The document was an improvement on the Secretary 
General’s earlier report—which simply listed given state preferences—insofar as 
it attempted systematically to assess state preferences and to underline areas of 
broad agreement among groups of states. The document’s main contribution was 
that it broke the general problem of Security Council reform into a set of specific 
sub-problems. Its aim was to advance the debate to a new level by dispensing
61 UN Doc. A/48/264.
62 UN Doc. A/48/47: 2.




























































































Positionality, Tension and Instability in the UN Security Council
with the general exchange of views that characterised the OEWG’s first two 
sessions in order to “move on to the next phase of the work, i.e., a process of 
actual negotiations.”64
In its second report to the General Assembly, however, the OEWG as a 
whole displayed significantly less confidence and ambition than had its co- 
chairmen. It distanced itself from the co-chairmen’s report complaining that it had 
not taken into account all opinions on reforming the Security Council, stressing 
that the co-chairmen’s compendium “[had] no legal status, that it [did] not 
constitute the position of the Open-ended. Working Group, nor [did] it prejudice 
the position of any delegation.”65 The report concluded in a similar vein as the 
previous one by stating that “important differences continue to exist on key issues 
before the Open-ended Working Group, and, therefore, further in-depth 
consideration of these issues is still required.”66
Despite the fact that the OEWG’s reports to date have not pointed to any 
immediate resolution of the question of Security Council reform, the Working 
Group has been relatively successful in advancing the reform debate, albeit 
slowly. There are three main reasons for this success. First, the OEWG has 
facilitated the dissemination of detailed information among UN member states 
regarding the reform preferences of all states.
Second, as a direct result of creating an information-rich environment, the 
OEWG has succeeded in breaking the overarching problem of Security Council 
reform into a small number of more easily digestible sub-problems. Good 
examples of these are given in the Co-Chairmen’s Report wherein they list the 
various issues to be addressed in resolving the question of equitable 
representation on and increase in membership of the Security Council67 and 
provide specific questions to be addressed by each member while engaging in the 
debate on reform.68
It is interesting to note, however, that many OEWG members consider 
these sub-problems to be tightly inter-linked, the resolution of each being 
dependent on the resolution of all others. In the language of organisational
64 UN Doc. A/49/965: 16.
65 UN Doc. A/49/47: 4.
66 UN Doc. A/49/47: 5.
The report breaks the problem of Security Council reform into the following sub-problem 
areas: Principles of membership expansion, optimal size of an expanded Security Council, 
criteria for new permanent members, extension of veto to new permanent members, 
removal of re-election ban, and new categories of membership.




























































































Patrick A. Mc Carthy
learning, therefore, the problem of reforming the Security Council constitutes a 
non-decomposable, or at least a nearly non-decomposable set—a general problem 
area within which sub-problems may be identified but not easily dealt with in 
isolation from all of the other sub-problems in the set.69 Since any reform solution 
will, therefore, by necessity be a “package-deal,” a great amount of negotiation, 
compromise and side-payments will be necessary in order to reach a solution. 
The OEWG provides a suitable forum for such interactions.
Finally, the OEWG has begun to learn, despite its relatively short 
existence, to adapt its operational procedures in order to improve its own 
effectiveness. The extent of this learning to date has been small but augurs well 
for the future effectiveness of the Working Group. As a result of disappointment 
with progress towards initiating actual negotiations on reform, the OEWG has 
adopted a number of innovations intended to increase the productivity of its 
deliberations. During the 49th General Assembly, it divided its discussions into 
two “clusters;” one dealing with equitable representation on and increase in the 
membership of the Security Council and the other dealing with all other matters 
related to the Security Council. This allowed the OEWG to decouple reform- 
related issues from issues not directly related to the reform of Security Council 
membership and to advance with the former independently of the latter.
A second innovation has been the increased use of informal consultations 
between smaller groups of OEWG members. As well as conducting 11 formal 
meetings during the 49th session of the General Assembly, the OEWG met for 
informal consultations on an additional 21 occasions. Because these consultations 
normally involved the participation of a smaller number of states, they operated 
more like subcommittees than like a plenary session of the General Assembly. 
Restricting the size of meetings improved the group’s decision-making capacity 
since, as one observer pointed out, “when the entire group [met], it [made] no 
progress.”70
Having taken into consideration these positive influences of the OEWG, 
however, it would be a mistake to overvalue its contribution to diffusing tension 
in the UN organisation. Although it has succeeded in advancing the reform debate 
in the ways outlined above, the OEWG has failed thus far to initiate an actual 
reform process. This is mainly due to the nature of the OEWG itself. It is simply 
an instrument of the UN member states established to bring the question of 
Security Council reform to the forefront of UN debate. Whether and how the
69 E. B. Haas, When Knowledge is Power; Three Models o f Change in International 
Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).




























































































Positionality, Tension and Instability in the UN Security Council
debate is resolved depends entirely on the actions of its members, all 185 of 
them. The OEWG does not itself possess any special procedural mechanisms or 
decision-making rules that might speed agreement on reform. Furthermore, the 
negative reaction of the OEWG to the initiative displayed by its co-chairmen does 
not augur well for the future effectiveness of the working group.
6. Conclusion
Since the beginning of the current debate on Security Council reform in the early 
1990s, the UN organisation has witnessed an intense interplay of positionality 
forces. On the one hand, rising states have displayed upward positionality by 
attempting to improve upon their position in the UN’s hierarchy of influence. On 
the other hand, those states whose positions are most threatened by the 
aspirations of rising states have displayed downward positionality by resisting 
demotion therein. As a result of the interplay of these opposing positionality 
forces, tension has been generated. The UN organisation has responded by 
establishing a working-group to facilitate agreement on Security Council reform 
and thereby to diffuse tension in the organisation. Despite having made important 
progress in advancing the reform debate, however, this working-group has not 
succeeded in significantly reducing this tension.
According to the definition of stability presented at the outset, therefore, 
the UN Security Council is an unstable system of international governance. It is 
ill-equipped with effective mechanisms for diffusing the tension generated by the 
interplay of upward and downward positionality. In other words, it has difficulty 
adapting its hierarchy of influence in line with shifts in the distribution of power 
among states.
The reasons for this may be found in the Security Council’s institutional 
structure. The rules governing the structure and procedure of the Security Council 
tend to bolster downward positionality and undermine upward positionality. Since 
only permanent members possess the right of veto, it is impossible to dislodge 
them from their privileged position in the UN’s hierarchy of influence without 
their consent. In this way, downward positionality is strengthened by the 
institutional design of the Security Council. On the other hand, rising states that 
aspire to greater influence within the organisation—rather than being 
automatically entitled to it as a direct consequence of a relative increase in their 
capabilities—must gain the support of two-thirds of the UN membership, 
including all permanent members of the Security Council, in order rise in the 
UN’s hierarchy of influence. In this way, upward positionality is undermined by 
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The Security Council can only be made more stable by reversing this state 
of affairs; i.e., by undermining downward positionality and by supporting—or at 
least not inhibiting—upward positionality. Providing for the latter without also 
ensuring the former is not enough, however. In other words, simply facilitating 
the achievement of permanent membership by rising states will not make the 
Security Council more stable unless the possibility also exists to demote current 
permanent members. Even if the OEWG succeeds, therefore, in reaching 
agreement on reform that adds a number of permanent members to the Security 
Council, it will not contribute to the overall stability of the Council since it is 
impossible to demote any of the current permanent members. This may not 
present much of a problem the first time that permanent members are added to the 
Security Council. In the longer run, however, continually adding permanent 
members without also demoting others will seriously undermine the Council’s 
effectiveness.
In order to improve the stability of the Security Council, therefore, it is just 
as important to undermine downward positionality as it is to support upward 
positionality. If this could be achieved, the ability of the Security Council to adapt 
its hierarchy of influence in line with shifts in the relative power of UN members 
would be greatly facilitated and, thus, its stability greatly improved. Here lies the 
main problem, however. Undermining downward positionality in the Security 
Council will remain extremely difficult for as long as permanent members have 
the power to maintain their position through the use of their veto. Since it does 
not seem that this state of affairs will change in the foreseeable future, the 
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